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STUDENT NOTES
the shareholder, when the sale is on the open market, because the
parties deal solely with reference to the market value and as mere
strangers without any knowledge of or regard for the relation of
director and stockholder. A stronger ground for such an ex-
ception would be the impracticability of notice in such case.'
Likewise, in the case of corporate disability to act, the imprac-
ticability of giving notice, or the need for immediate or secret
action to make the business undertaking a success might cause
an exception to the rule, but in the ordinary case give the share-
holders the privilege of carrying out the undertaking in some
other form, if they are under a disability to act as a corporation.
-- JOHN HAMPTON HOGE.
SPEcIc PERFORMANCE - MUTUALITY DoCTRINE IN WEST
VIRGINA. - "A contract to be specifically enforced by the court
must be mutual-that is to say such that it might, at the time it
was entered into, have been enforced by either of the parties
against the other of them."
Attempts to apply the doctrine of mutuality as thus laid
down by Fry have led to much confusion. Often while one court
was quoting it to prove that a certain type of contract could not
be enforced specifically, another would be citing it as grounds for
7 Walker, The Duty of Disclosure by a Director Purchasing Stock from
His Stockholders (1923) -2 YALE L. J. 637; BALLANTiNE, PRIVATE CORPORA-
TIONS (1927) 398.
2 RY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS (3d ed 1884) § 440. Compare
POMEROY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS (1897) § 165, "If the
remedy of specific performance of a contract exists at all, it must be mutual;
the remedy must be attainable alike by both parties to the agreement." See
the same author eight years later in 6 POMEROY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENOE
(3d ed. 1905) § 769, where he says, "It is a mutuality of remedy in equity
at the time of filing the bill that is required." Then see the fourth edition
of the same work, vol. 5, § 769, where Mr. Pomeroy says, "The court will
not grant specific performance to the plaintiff and at the same time leave
defendant to the legal remedy for possible future breaches on plaintiff's
side." For language to the same effect, see Ames, Mutuality in Speoifio
Performance (1903) 3 COL. L. REV. 1, 2. Professor Ames, however, continues,
"The reciprocity of remedy required is not the right of each party to the
contract to maintain a bill for specific performance against the other, but
simply the right of one party to refuse to perform, unless performance by
the other is given or assured." For an excellent article on the present
status of the mutuality doctrine, see Cook, The Present Status of the "Lack
of Mutuality" ule (1927) in 36 YALE L. J. 897. Mr. Cook concludes that
about all that seems to be required is that the other party will probably
continue to perform and that no serious injustice will be done.
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enforcing a similar contract under practically analogous facts and
circumstances. In Bumgardner v. Leavitt,' the West Virginia
Court of Appeals went so far as to hold that because of the doc-
trine of mutuality of remedy, A could have specific performance
in a suit against B for no other reason than that if B had been
bringing the suit, he could have maintained specific performance
against A. Then in Warren Co. v. Black Coal Co., Judge Williams
endorsed the opposite or so called negative phase of the mutuality
doctrine when he said, by way of dictum, that A could not have
specific performance of the contract, because, if B had been bring-
ing the suit against A, B's remedy at law would have been ade-.
quate. Such argument is not very convincing. Suppose the situa-
tion had been reversed in either ease, say in Bumgardner v.
Leavitt, and B had been bringing the suit; then the court would
1ave had to say, if it wished to be consistent, that B could not
have specific performance, because, on the merits of the case, A
was not entitled to it; or since it was available to A on account
of its being a proper remedy for B, B could now have it because
he 31imself could have it. This would amount to denying specific
-performanee of the contract to the party actually entitled to it
on the merits of the case, or else, to allowing him to have it only
by a process of reasoning so artificial' that it could not withstand
even a casual inspection. In Bumgardner V. Leavitt, the court
really found two independent grounds on which to base equity
jurisdiction; first, on the mutuality doctrine as has already been
explained, second, on the finding that A had no adequate remedy
at law. Thus -while the case is a holding on the mutuality doc-
trine, it does not necessarily convince one that the court would
have held the same way if it had been compelled to predicate its
decision entirely upon that doctrine.
In Eclipse Oil Co. v. South Penn Oil Co.,' the court said, "If
a contract is incapable of being specifically enforced against one
party, that party is equally incapable of enforcing it against the
other". That would appear to be a literal application of Fry's
mutuality doctrine, but the facts of that case show that there was
really no contract to be enforced. The plaintiff had paid no con-
35 W. Va. 194, 13 S. E. 67 (1891).
8.85 W. Va. 684, 688, 102 S. E. 672, 674 (1920). Specific performance
was denied in this case because the subject matter was not such as would
give equity jurisdiction. The remedy of either party at law was adequate.
'Langdell, Leoture Notes (1888) I H] v. L. REv. 104, "The rule as to
mutuality of remedy is obscure in principle and extent, artificial, and difficult
to understand and remember."
47 W, a. 84, -103, 34 S. E, 923, 931 (1899).
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sideration. Judge English, in Hissom v. Parrish,' quoted Fry's
mutuality doctrine, but it had no application, for the contract
was without consideration and concerned subject matter as to
which the remedy at law was adequate. (Both of the preceding
suits were really on options for which no consideration had been
paid.) The opinion in Latitrop v. Collieries Co.' intimates that
the remedy of specific performance must be available to both
parties; but the contract there was such that either party could
clearly have enforced it specifically; so the point did not come up
for adjudication in that suit.
A number of exceptions to this doctrine of mutuality have
been pretty generally recognized. Fry himself listed about eight.'
Apparently West Virginia has always held that a contract for the
sale of land, signed only by one party, was enforceable against the
party who signed, even though the other party was not bound at
all under the statute of frauds.' In Capehart, Ex'r. v. Hale' °
Judge Hoffman expressed the attitude very well when he said,
"The doctrine as to the necessity of mutual liability under the
statute of frauds, formerly maintained, has long since been aban-
doned." A somewhat analogous situation is that in which the
vendee has entered and done acts of part performance under an
oral contract for the sale of land. Providing the part performance
has been sufficient, the West Virginia court finds no obstacle in
the way of enforcing such contract ;" but it is pretty clear that
there is no mutuality of remedy, at least, not in the majority of
cases.
In Bowden v. Laing," an agent was allowed to enforce
specifically a contract to sell land. The agent had signed in such
a way that he was liable for damages only and his principal was
' 41 W. Va. 686, 690, 24 S. E. 600, 601 (1896).
770 W. Va. 58, 73 S. E. 299 (1911) "A contract for the sale of land
which so binds both parties that either may compel the other to perform
cannot be held void for want of mutuality."
'FRY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1884) §§ 444-452.
' Ruekman v. Hay, 92 W. Va. 97, 114 S. E. 514 (1922); Mountain Park
Land Co. v. Snidow, 77 W. Va. 54, 86 S. E. 915 (1915); Armstrong v. Coal
Co., 67 W. Va. 589, 69 S. E. 195 (1910); Creigh's Admr. v. Boggs, 19 W.
Va. 240 (1881).
106 W. Va. 547 (1873).
2 Bryson v. MceShane, 48 W. Va. 126, 35 S. E. 848 (1900); Boyd v.
Brown, 47 W. Va. 238, 34 S. E. 907 (1899); Development Co. v. Thornburg,
46 W. Va. 99, 33 S. E. 108 (1899); Campbell v. Fetterman, 20 W. Va. 398
(1882); Middleton v. Selby, 19 W. Va. 167 (1881); Lorentz v. Lorentz, 14
W. Va. 761 (1879); West Va. 0. & 0. Co. v. Vinal, 14 W. Va. 637 (1879);
Baldenburg v. Warder, 14 W. Va. 397 (1878); Vickers v. Sisson's Admr., 10
W. Va. 12 (1877); Lowry v. Buffington, 6 W. Va. 249 (1873).
"103 W. Va. 733, 138 S. E. 449 (1927). Accord: Rollyson v. Bourn, 85
W. Va. 15, 100 S. E. 682 (1919).
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not bound at all. On bringing suit, he tendered a proper deed from
his principal. The court said, "It is the mutuality at the time
of filing the bill, or of the decree, that is required, and not the
mutuality in terms of the contract." Likewise, in Dodson v.
Hays,' the vendor on tendering a proper deed was granted specific
performance, although at the time the contract was made, he had
no title to the land. The court said that while the remedy must
usually be mutual, yet that was not necessary when at the time
of making the contract, the vendee knew that there was a defect
in the vendor's title to such an extent that he could not be com-
pelled to perform specifically. In HaU v. Philadelphia Co., ' a
covenant in a lease by which free gas was to be furnished to the
owner of the leased premises was specifially enforced. Appar-
ently the lack of mutuality was not even noticed; at least no men-
tion was made of it.
Contracts made by a party under disability are not usually
enforced at the suit of either party while the disability exists; but
the court's refusal to enforce is not predicated on a lack of
mutuality alone. Mutuality really has very little to do with it,
for the same contract will ordinarily be enforced in favor of the
party originally under disability after the disability has been re-
moved. Similarly, contracts which have been induced through
fraud or misrepresentation by one of the parties are, where other-
wise properly subject to specific performance, enforced at the
suit of the defrauded party, yet there is no mutuality of remedy
in such cases, for the fraud or material misrepresentation would
be a good defense for the party against whom it operated.
Some dicta are found to the effect that an option contract is
not specifically enforceable because of a lack of mutuality;!" but
generally where such an option is for valuable consideration, the
court treats it as an irrevocable, continuing offer which ripens into
a contract when properly accepted." Whether or not the con-
tract made by the acceptance is specifically enforceable depends
upon its own facts. Actually, by treating the option contract as
a continuing offer, the court is in effect specifically enforcing it.
In the same manner, it is specifically enforced at law. The
optionor is powerless to withdraw the offer. The option contract,
therefore, is specifically enforced, if one must apply such terms
29 W. Va. 577, 2 S. E. 415 (1887).
472 W. Va. 574, 78 S. E. 755 (1913).8 Eclipse Oil Co. v. South Penn Oil Co., supra n. 5; Hissom v. Parrish
aupra 3. 6.
"WeAver v, Burr, 31 W. Va. 736, 8 S. E, 743 (1888).
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to the situation, both in law and in equity notwithstanding its
lack of mutuality.
It appears, therefore, that in order to render justice in a
great variety of cases, equity is compelled to get away from the
mutuality doctrine. In most of the situations hereinbefore alluded
to, the plaintiff has either performed in full or tenders substantial
performance on filing his bill. When such is-the case, mutuality
of remedy could not possibly be of much importance, for the de-
fendant has either received or will get by the decree all that he has
bargained for. It remains to be considered whether or not the
mutuality doctrine serves any real need in connection with execu-
tory contracts where something remains to be done after the de-
cree. The seeming danger of leaving a defendant without ade-
quate protection in such cases is probably what called forth the
idea that the remedy must be mutual.
Where performance on both sides is to continue over a period
of time, Judge Meredith, in Elk Refining Co. v. Falling Bock
Cannel Coal Co.," quoting from a prior federal ease," said, "If
specific performance be otherwise proper, equity is not prevented
from granting its aid because of a mere lack of mutuality of
remedy. It is sufficient that defendant's compulsory performance
is conditioned upon the plaintiff's continued readiness to perform
its obligations". In the New York Court of Appeals, Judge
Cardozo used language of similar import in Epstein v. Gluckhin '
when he said, "What equity exacts today as a condition of relief
is assurance that the decree, if rendered, will operate without in-
justice or oppression either to plaintiff or defendant. Mutuality
of remedy is important in so far only as its presence is essential
to the attainment of that end." These statements illustrate what
is believed to be the modern view and what is conceded to be a
sound view of the mutuality doctrine. Judges are not now in-
dined to pay much attention to it when justice can be better
effectuated by some other means.
If the defendant's performance is to consist of a single act,
and the plaintiff is to perform over a period of time, it is not
always easy to ascertain that the decree will operate without in-
justice or oppression. There does not seem to be any West Vir-
ginia case exactly in point. However, it does not appear that the
mutuality doctrine would be of much assistance. Often such a
7 92 W. Va. 479, 115 S. E. 431 (1922).
'8Great Lakes & St. Lawrence Transp. Co. v. Scranton Coal Co., 289 Fed.
603 (1917).
" 233 N. Y. 490, 135 N. E. 861 (1922).
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contract could be enforced without danger of undue hardship to
defendant. His remedy at law might be sufficient to assure con-
tinued performance by the plaintiff.' Then too, there might be
strong economic or other reasons why the plaintiff would continue
to perform.' But even if it were undesirable to enforce the con-
tract, equity would not need to resort to the mutuality doctrine.
Since specific performance is a matter of privilege or discretion
rather than of right,' the chancellor can exercise his discretionary
power and refuse to enforce the contract when it appears that
to do so would operate with serious injustice toward one of the
parties.
Much dicta can be found to the effect that the mutuality doc-
trine is law in West Virginia; but no decision, based on that doc-
trine alone, has been discovered. On the contraray, the doctrine
has beeii repudiated in many situations where it would seem to
apply and has been entirely disregarded in others. Consequently,
it has become so used up with exceptions that there is not much
left of it. The general trend, apparently, is toward discarding
it entirely.
-GEORGE W. MCQUAIN.
2OZelleken v. Lynch, 80 Kan. 746, 104 Pac. 563 (1909).
Tribune Assn. v. Simonds, 104 AtI. 386 (N. J. Eq. 1918).
Wellman v. Virginia Ry. Co., 85 W. Va. 169, 101 S. E. 252 (1919); Big
Huff Coal Co. v. Thomas, 76 W. Va. 161, 85 S. E. 171 (1915);. Heflin v.
Heflin, 63 W. Va. 29, 59 S. E. 745 (1907); Ratliff v. Sommers, 55 W. Va.
30, 46 S. E. 712 (1904); Conaway v. Sweeney, 24 W. Va. 643 (1884). And
see Callahan v. Simms, 105 W. Va. 259, 262, 142 S. E. 443, 444 (1928).
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